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The authors argue that a high-organizational error management culture, conceptualized to include norms
and common practices in organizations (e.g., communicating about errors, detecting, analyzing, and
correcting errors quickly), is pivotal to the reduction of negative and the promotion of positive error
consequences. Organizational error management culture was positively related to firm performance
across 2 studies conducted in 2 different European countries. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative
cross-sectional data from 65 Dutch organizations, Study 1 revealed that organizational error management
culture was significantly correlated with both organizational goal achievement and an objective indicator
of economic performance. This finding was confirmed in Study 2, using change-of-profitability data from
47 German organizations. The results suggest that organizations may want to introduce organizational
error management as a way to boost firm performance.
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Every organization is confronted with errors. Errors can result in
negative consequences (e.g., loss of time, faulty products) as well
as positive ones (e.g., learning, innovation). The negative conse-
quences—for example, accidents such as the Chernobyl or Chal-
lenger disasters—tend to be observable (Meijman & Mulder,
1998) and have been of high interest to scholars and laypeople
alike (Reason, 1990). The scientific understanding of the negative
effects of errors is much better developed than that of the potential
positive effects of errors. Much of accident research and ap-
proaches within cognitive psychology, as well as popular ideas,
have conceptualized errors as constituting primarily negative
events. This line of research has supported the concept of error
prevention—the attempt to block erroneous actions whenever pos-
sible (Reason, 1990).
The potential long-term positive consequences of errors, such as
learning, innovation, and resilience, however, are less obvious
(Sitkin, 1996), although people readily agree that they can learn
from errors (e.g., Jones & O’Brien, 1991; McCune, 1997). In the
long run, organizations that have an effective approach to errors
may be more profitable because these organizations learn from
errors, are more apt to experiment, and are more likely to innovate.
Unfortunately, much of the evidence for using a positive organi-
zational approach to errors is still anecdotal (Peters, 1987) and
needs to be empirically validated.
One way to contain the negative and to promote the positive
consequences of errors is to use error management. This approach
assumes that human errors per se can never be completely pre-
vented, and, therefore, it is necessary to ask the question of what
can be done after an error has occurred (Frese, 1991, 1995). The
error management approach distinguishes between errors and their
consequences. Whereas error prevention aims at avoiding negative
error consequences by avoiding the error altogether, error man-
agement focuses on reducing negative error consequences and on
increasing potentially positive consequences. We conceptualize
error management similarly to how others have conceptualized
stress management—an approach that does not aim at changing the
stressor itself but rather focusing on how to change individuals’
responses to these stressors to reduce their negative consequences
(Murphy, 1996). As such, error management is an approach that
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does not attempt to do away with errors completely but rather
attempts to deal with errors and their consequences after an error
has occurred. In addition, error management ensures that errors are
quickly reported and detected, that negative error consequences are
effectively handled and minimized, and that learning occurs
(Frese, 1991, 1995). Examples of using an error management
approach can be found in software systems (e.g., the Undo func-
tion), physical setups (e.g., the containment egg around nuclear
power plants), crew and individual behaviors (e.g., cross-checking
in the cockpit that leads to “error trapping,” i.e., catching the error
before its negative consequences can unfold; see Helmreich &
Merritt, 2000), and organizational practices. Although the focus of
this research is on error management, we believe that organizations
should use both error prevention and error management ap-
proaches so that, despite the ubiquity of errors, negative error
consequences are effectively handled.
Theoretical Development
Errors are not easily defined (Senders & Moray, 1991). Errors
are unintended deviations from goals, standards, a code of behav-
ior, the truth, or from some true value (Merriam-Webster, 1967).
In the present study, we are primarily concerned with action
errors, which we define as unintended deviations from plans,
goals, or adequate feedback processing as well as an incorrect
action that results from lack of knowledge (Reason, 1990; Zapf,
Brodbeck, Frese, Peters, & Pru¨mper, 1992). People may make
errors by selecting wrong objectives in the first place, which are
wrong from a higher level perspective (e.g., Columbus had the
goal of sailing West; however, from a higher level perspective, this
was an error because he wanted to find a short route to India).
Errors can, in principle, be differentiated from inefficiencies be-
cause inefficient pursuit does, in the end, reach the goal. However,
most people hold a standard of efficiency (and certainly companies
do); thus, inefficient routes are deviations from this standard, and,
from this perspective, inefficient actions are erroneous and man-
agers sometimes report inefficiencies as examples of errors. Be-
cause of the unintentional nature of the deviation that characterizes
errors, errors typically lead to the aversive feeling that one should
have known better. The unintentional nature of the deviation is
also one way to differentiate errors from violations (which are
intentional deviations from standards, norms, practices, or
recommendations).
Often, organizations rely on error prevention only. We argue
that the exclusive emphasis on error prevention has its limits
because total elimination of errors is impossible (Garud, Nayyar,
& Shapira, 1999; Reason, 1997). The fallibility of human reason-
ing is the flipside of the advantages of the human cognitive
apparatus characterized by fast processing in uncertain environ-
ments (Reason, 1990) and bounded rationality (March & Simon,
1958). Therefore, a pure error prevention approach cannot deal
adequately with the fact that errors are ubiquitous. Although we
usually cannot predict what specific error will occur (or when),
invariably, errors will occur and may lead to negative conse-
quences. Moreover, a pure error prevention approach reduces the
chances to learn from errors and minimizes the possibility to
benefit from the potential long-term positive consequences of
errors.
Organizational theorists have differentiated between control and
learning perspectives, with both perspectives being important for
the long-term success of organizations (Sitkin, Sutcliffe, Roger, &
Schroeder, 1994). The organizational goal of avoiding negative
error consequences is conceptually associated with the more gen-
eral goal of control. Pure error prevention does not necessarily
allow for learning to occur (Sitkin, 1996), and some learning
strategies, such as experimentation (Huber, 1991), are in direct
conflict with error prevention’s goal of control. In contrast, an
organizational error management approach is conceptually associ-
ated with the more general goal of learning. This view is supported
by research on error management training, which has demonstrated
that errors can contribute to learning in individuals (Frese, 1995;
Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998). Errors may represent a
form of negative feedback (i.e., one has not achieved a goal) and,
as such, present the individual with valuable information about
how to alter one’s course of action to ultimately achieve a goal.
Learning takes place when people are encouraged to learn from
errors (Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003), when they
think about errors metacognitively (e.g., planning, monitoring, and
evaluating one’s actions), and when the negative emotional impact
of errors is reduced (Keith & Frese, 2005). One may be tempted to
suggest presenting hypothetical errors (i.e., errors that have not
occurred) to learn from them (March, 1991). However, this strat-
egy has drawbacks stemming from artificiality, lack of validity,
and absence of real consequences of the hypothetical errors
(Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000).
Organizations may be able to benefit from simultaneously pur-
suing the goal of control and the goal of learning, and we propose
that error management is well suited for supporting such an ap-
proach. On the control side, error management implies quick error
detection and damage control. With regard to learning from errors,
error management uses errors as learning opportunities and en-
courages exploration and experimentation. Error management,
thus, overcomes the inherent conflict in allocating resources be-
tween control and learning perspectives.
Error Management Culture
We suggest that error management can be applied to the orga-
nizational level by using the concept of culture (Klein, Dansereau,
& Hall, 1994). Culture implies that there is a system of shared
norms and values and a set of common practices in an organization
(Reichers & Schneider, 1990). Culture and climate are inherently
difficult to differentiate (Reichers & Schneider, 1990). In keeping
with cross-cultural psychology, culture should be defined as refer-
ring to both norms and practices (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorf-
man, & Gupta, 2004). However, because we believe that individ-
uals are more likely to accurately assess the more visible aspects of
their organization’s culture rather than the hidden norms and
assumptions, this article focuses on shared practices and
procedures.
Figure 1 displays our theoretical arguments. Error management
culture encompasses organizational practices related to communi-
cating about errors, to sharing error knowledge, to helping in error
situations, and to quickly detecting and handling errors. We sug-
gest that high-error management culture translates into high-firm
performance via mediators that decrease negative error conse-
quences (via control of these consequences) and simultaneously
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increase positive consequences of errors (via learning, initiative,
and innovation). In this article, we are not concerned with safety,
accidents, and catastrophes (although we believe that these areas
may also benefit from an error management culture) but rather
with the impact of errors on firm performance.
Communication about errors probably constitutes the most im-
portant error management practice (see Figure 1). A high degree of
communication about errors allows for the development of shared
knowledge about errors. Because people talk freely about their
errors in a high-error management culture, they develop a mutual
understanding of high-risk situations (i.e., error traps) and of
effective error handling strategies (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner,
Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Communicating about errors
makes it possible for others to help in error situations, for example,
if employees know a coworker is working in an area that is
conducive to making errors (e.g., preparing complex negotiations
or writing complex software). In addition, open communication
should also facilitate the quick detection and handling of errors
(see Helmreich & Merritt, 2000). The time between the occurrence
and the detection of an error is crucial because errors that remain
undetected produce negative consequences that are more severe
than errors that are detected quickly (cf. Reason’s, 1990, notion of
latent failure). Open communication about errors, a shared under-
standing of potential error situations, being able to help others in
such situations, and fast error detection should allow for quick,
smooth, and well-coordinated error handling, reducing the poten-
tial negative error consequences frequently associated with errors
(Sitkin, 1996).
There are some organizations that have cultivated certain sys-
tematic approaches to facilitating communication about errors. For
example, an American consulting firm throws a party whenever a
project fails, explicitly creating a situation in which communica-
tion about errors can naturally occur. Similarly, a chief executive
officer of a large German organization keeps a “golden book” to
record errors that occurred over the course of various projects.
However, many organizations tend to punish the occurrence of
errors, thereby reducing potential communication about such inci-
dents. This is detrimental, especially considering that people are
inherently hesitant to talk about their errors because they know that
this likely leads to negative attributions. Hindsight bias and the
fundamental attribution bias (Brown, Williams, & Leeshaley,
1994; Gilbert & Malone, 1995) make it difficult to discuss one’s
errors because people suspect that they will be blamed and that
errors will be attributed to undesirable personality traits, lack of
knowledge and skills, or low intelligence. Organizational error
management culture must actively work against these biases by
rewarding the communication about errors and by inhibiting their
punishment (Edmondson, 1999).
High-error management culture reduces negative and promotes
positive error consequences (see Mediators in Figure 1 in the box
with stippled lines, these mediators are theoretically described but
have not been operationalized in our studies). In organizations with
a high-error management culture, the negative consequences of
errors are likely to be reduced or, at least, more easily contained
because people in such organizations know that errors appear and,
consequently, attempt to control the potential damage resulting
from errors. In addition, a high-error management culture, espe-
cially open error communication, encourages learning from er-
rors—without communication, employees are only able to benefit
from their own errors. However, when errors are openly commu-
nicated, learning from others’ errors becomes possible as well.
Secondary error prevention follows from better, that is, shared
knowledge of different error situations. An error management
culture may also stimulate organizational innovativeness. Innova-
tions are inherently uncertain, and, therefore, errors are likely to
occur. An organization’s innovativeness should be higher when
people are confident they will not be blamed or ridiculed when
errors occur (Edmondson, 1999). Moreover, accepting errors as a
natural part of work and communicating about errors should en-
courage individuals to explore and experiment. Errors may actu-
ally inspire individuals to develop a better and more sophisticated
understanding of a particular situation that caused an error to
occur. Exploration and experimentation may, therefore, be in-
creased after an error occurred (Dormann & Frese, 1994). Em-
ployees do not tend to show initiative when they expect to be
punished for their errors that may co-occur while acting proac-
tively (Frese & Fay, 2001). Therefore, a high degree of personal
initiative and experimentation may follow from a better error
management culture. Communication about errors, quick error
detection, as well as effective and coordinated error handling make
it possible to improve product quality, service quality, and work
procedures.
Empirically, there is evidence that the absence of errors is not
necessarily a good predictor of future success. Given dynamic
changes, prior success may lead to a lower degree of success in the
future (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Bragger, Hantula, Bragger,
Figure 1. Error management culture and its potential effects. Stippled lines indicate that these mediators are
theoretically described but have not been operationalized in our studies.
1230 VAN DYCK, FRESE, BAER, AND SONNENTAG
& Kirnan, 2003). Lack of error management in a firm may help to
explain the “paradox of success.” Because successful firms have
developed successful routines, there are fewer errors, there is less
attention paid to errors, and the negative feedback from errors is
less salient and less clear—all of which may diminish future
success: “Following success, the amount of information sought
from unfavorable sources decreases” (Audia et al., 2000, pp.
849–850).
On the group level, Edmondson’s (1996) research on errors in a
medical setting revealed that highly performing teams reported
more errors. Edmondson concluded that these teams had a better
error climate, which allowed them to talk about errors, in turn,
increasing error detection and correction. Furthermore, the open
climate, characterized by willingness to report and discuss errors,
probably stimulated learning from errors (cf. Cannon & Edmond-
son, 2001).
Building on this research, we propose that an error management
approach be studied in terms of organizational culture. In line with
Rochlin (1999), we argue that there is a cultural dimension to how
organizations deal with errors. However, we do not assume ho-
mogeneous cultural dimensions to exist in large organizations,
and, obviously, homogeneity has to be shown empirically (Koz-
lowski & Klein, 2000). Consequently, preference should be given
to medium-sized or smaller companies when doing organizational
culture research because the likelihood of a homogeneous culture
to exist in such organizations is higher than in large companies. On
the basis of these arguments and the previous literature, we ad-
vance the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Error management culture is positively related
to firm performance.
In addition to examining the potential relation between error
management culture and company performance, we explored the
possibility that error aversion culture—another dimension of or-
ganizations’ error culture and comprising aspects such as covering
up and experiencing strain from errors—may relate negatively to
firm performance and to error management culture. Errors may
produce strain by causing additional demands on the erring indi-
vidual. In error situations, individuals not only have to deal with
the task at hand but also with the error and its potential conse-
quences, along with their negative self-image. In organizations in
which errors tend not to be punished and are accepted as part of
work, the additional cognitive demands of errors may be poten-
tially reduced because there is less need for individuals to cope
with their negative self-image by hiding errors or blaming others
(Hockey, 1996; see also Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Tuttle, & Sego, 1995).
Moreover, because strain may lead to additional errors, it is likely
that in organizations with low-error aversion culture, secondary
errors tend to be avoided, and error handling is done more effec-
tively, ultimately resulting in better firm performance.
Research question: Is error aversion culture negatively related
to firm performance and to error management culture?
To test our hypothesis and research question, we conducted two
studies surveying medium-sized companies in two European coun-
tries. In addition, Study 1 also included qualitative interviews with
a subset of organizations.
STUDY 1
Method
Sample and Procedures
To obtain a random sample of medium-sized firms in the Netherlands,
we used a commercial agency’s database. In total, we approached 300
companies employing 100 and 500 employees working in the same plant,
office, or site. To ensure that the relations between error culture and firm
performance would not be restricted to certain industry sectors, we in-
cluded different industries in our sample: automation (IT), retail trade,
construction, publishing, wholesale, machine and appliances, transport,
insurance, consultancy, and banks. On the basis of these sectors, we
developed four broad industry categories: production and construction
(n 19), business services (n 16), finances and insurances (n 10), and
trade (n  20), with companies randomly selected from these categories.
In collecting information on organizational culture, we focused on
managers for two reasons: First, managers receive information on a wide
variety of departments and are therefore a more valid source for the
assessment of an organization’s culture. Second, managers play a key role
in forming and shaping an organization’s culture by setting the tone in the
organization and determining the kinds of behaviors that are expected and
supported (Schein, 1992). One or two managers per company were invited
to participate in our study. We asked these contact persons to distribute
questionnaires on organizational error culture to their colleagues, providing
us with what they considered the most representative cross-section of their
company’s management. We only included firms that returned at least
three completed questionnaires. In terms of individual participants, 380
questionnaires were returned. Because only organizations with three or
more respondents were included in our analyses, a usable sample of 65
organizations resulted (22% response rate). Of the 350 participants in these
65 organizations, 297 respondents were men, 43 were women, and 10 did
not reveal their gender. On average, 5.4 managers per organization partic-
ipated in our study (the range was from 3 to 10 participants per company).
Participating managers generally had a position just above midlevel
management.
Study 1: Survey
Measures
Error culture. We derived our measure of error management culture
from an earlier instrument—the Error Orientation Questionnaire—(EOQ;
Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999), which was validated and de-
veloped for individuals. Specifically, we adapted the items of the EOQ in
such a way that they referred to common organizational practices and
instructed participants to rate the extent to which each statement applied to
the people in their organization in general. A factor analysis of these
aggregated, company-level scores revealed two factors: error management
culture and error aversion culture. Items were answered on a scale ranging
from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (applies completely); coefficient alphas
were .92 for the 17-item Error Management Scale and .88 for the 11-item
error aversion measure (see the Appendix for items).
As we sampled managers from different functional areas and from
organizations from a variety of industries, we did not specify the type of
errors respondents were to think about while responding to our question-
naire. However, at the end of the survey, we asked managers to report on
the situations they had thought of while filling out the questionnaire.
Examples of these error situations include misplacing a finished product,
ordering wrong supplies so that a product could not be finished on time,
errors in planning and budgeting a project, and error of not sharing a piece
of information. The examples show that most errors that occurred were not
catastrophic in nature but rather related to everyday actions in organiza-
tions. Moreover, there were no errors that were directly related to the area
of safety.
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Firm performance. To be able to compare performance among the
diverse set of companies and industries represented in our sample, we used
two indicators of firm performance: firm goal achievement and survivabil-
ity. Firm goal achievement captures one aspect of firm performance,
namely, how well a company is doing with regard to its own goals and in
comparison to its direct competitors (“To what degree has your organiza-
tion achieved its most important goal in the last year?”; “How successful
is your organization in comparison to other companies in the same line of
industry and of (about) the same size?”). The first item was rated on a scale
that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely); the second item was rated
on a scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Items were
averaged to form a single indicator (  .65, which is adequate for a
two-item measure).
Survivability, as an indicator of firm economic performance, was taken
from a yearbook published by a Dutch consultancy agency that collects
information on the yearly performance of a large number of Dutch com-
panies (De Breed & Partners, 1996). The advantages of this measure are
that it combines several economic performance indicators and that it allows
for the comparison of firms across different lines of industry.1 A major
disadvantage of this index, however, is that it was only available for a
subset of 25 firms in our sample. Another disadvantage is that the precise
nature of the regression analyses used to calculate the index is proprietary
material of De Breed and Partners and cannot be published. However, the
index is widely used in Dutch industry because it constitutes a good
indicator of company success and survival.
Control variables. We controlled for company age (years), firm size
(number of employees), and line of industry (for which we created three
dummy-coded variables to represent the four broad industry categories).
The unit of analysis in the present study is the organization. For a
construct to exist at the organizational level, however, two criteria must be
met (Kenny & La Voie, 1985; Klein et al., 2000). First, the construct must
be conceptually meaningful at the organizational level. We have argued
above that this is indeed the case. Second, individual judgments of orga-
nizational dimensions must converge so that there is good within-group
agreement. To test whether there was agreement within organizations on
the ratings of error culture and firm goal achievement, we calculated
estimates of within-group interrater reliability (James, Demaree, & Wolf,
1984). The average values for rWG(J) (within-group interrater reliability
statistic) across all 65 companies were .92 for error management culture,
.90 for error aversion culture, and .86 for firm goal achievement. Overall,
values of interrater reliability exceeded the .70 criterion suggested by Klein
et al. (2000), indicating an acceptable level of agreement within organiza-
tions and justifying aggregation of data to the organizational level.
Study 1: Survey Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations of all study variables are
displayed in Table 1. In line with our expectations, we found error
aversion culture to be negatively associated with error manage-
ment culture, although the correlation missed the conventional
significance criterion (r  –.20, p  .10). In contrast to our
expectation, the correlation between firm goal achievement and
economic performance did not reach statistical significance (r 
.24, p  .05; please note that n  25 for firm survivability).
We tested our hypothesis using hierarchical regression analyses,
entering the control variables of age, size, and industry categories
in Step 1 and error management culture and error aversion culture
in Step 2. As hypothesized, error management culture was posi-
tively and significantly related to both firm goal achievement and
firm survivability (  .42, p  .01 and   .51, p  .05,
respectively, see Table 2). However, we found no significant
relations between error aversion culture and the two indicators of
performance, firm goal achievement and firm survivability ( 
.16, p .05 and  .31, p .05, respectively). Thus, Hypothesis
1 was supported.2 With respect to our research question, there was
no evidence that error aversion culture was related to firm
performance.
Study 1: Interviews
The qualitative part of the study was done at the same time as
the survey was administered and served to embellish the survey
results and to illustrate managers’ thinking about errors. To this
end, we approached 10 of the 65 participating companies. Of these,
8 (from the fields of automation, administration, retail, construc-
tion, wholesale, insurance, and technical consultancy) were willing
to participate in an interview study. These companies were se-
lected for their variation on the following dimensions: error man-
agement culture (ranging from 3.09 to 3.67 in the survey), error
aversion culture (ranging from 2.21 to 3.00), firm goal achieve-
ment (ranging from 2.89 to 3.96), and firm survivability (ranging
from 3.00 to 5.00). Using a critical incident approach (Flanagan,
1954), two research assistants interviewed two managers from
each of the 8 companies about two separate error incidents, result-
ing in 16 interviews on a total of 32 incidents. All of the interview
partners had been participants in the survey. Interviews lasted
1–1.5 hr and were administered face-to-face, audio-recorded, and
later transcribed.
The goal of our qualitative study was to get answers to the
following questions: (a) How difficult or easy was it for managers
to talk about errors? (b) What kind of errors did managers think
about when they talked about errors? (c) Did managers and their
organizations have a clear vision or mission statement regarding
errors, and was there a general rationale and conscious approach
toward errors? (d) Did managers’ statements about errors and how
organizations dealt with them naturally fall into categories of error
management culture and error aversion culture (and potentially
additional categories)?
We used the following procedure to code the interview material:
First, two raters unfamiliar with the study identified all text seg-
ments that were related to an organization’s error culture (yes/no;
Cohen’s   .86). In cases of disagreement, raters discussed and
1 More specifically, multiple-discriminant analysis was used to distin-
guish between solvent and insolvent companies (De Breed & Partners,
1996). For each line of business, separate regression models were devel-
oped, based on recent data on insolvency in that particular industry. These
regression models took into account commonly used economic data such as
profit rate, cash flow, and added value and resulted in a score between 1
(very poor) and 5 (excellent). A low score indicated high resemblance to
companies that had become insolvent in previous years, whereas a high
score indicated high resemblance to companies that had been successful in
previous years.
2 As described in the Study 1: Survey Results section, the data loss on the
objective measure of performance is not random but relates to line of
business, type of organization, and size of the company. To test for size and
industry effects (in addition to our use of control variables for the full
sample), we divided the entire sample of 65 firms into two subsamples—
one consisting of organizations for which we had firm survivability infor-
mation and the other consisting of firms for which we had no such
information available—and repeated our analyses, predicting firm goal
achievement using both of these samples. Both analyses yielded virtually
identical results.
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decided together whether a segment was indicative of the way
errors were dealt with in the organization. About half of the total
number of segments captured aspects of an organization’s error
culture (resulting in a total of 261 segments), and these segments
were further categorized and scored. Then, two raters familiar with
the theoretical underpinnings of this study examined the text
segments and developed four broad error culture categories: error
management, empathy, blame and punishment, and error aversion.
Next, the same raters sorted the error culture segments of the
transcripts into the four categories (Cohen’s   .69). In cases of
disagreement, raters discussed the differences and mutually agreed
on a category. Finally, these raters assigned a score between 1
(low) and 5 (high) to each segment of the transcripts (Cohen’s 
.76). In cases of disagreement, scores of the two raters were
averaged. On average, 16.1 segments per interview were catego-
rized and scored. For each company, we calculated a mean score
for each of the four categories.
Study 1: Interview Results
An interesting finding of our qualitative study was the absence
of mission statements and organizational visions concerning er-
rors. Only 1 of the 16 managers indicated that their organization
had an explicit approach to errors, which, in this particular case,
focused on error prevention. Ten other managers indicated that
their organization did not have a specific vision regarding errors.
The remaining 5 managers indicated that errors had never been
discussed on the organizational level. Statements were, for exam-
ple, “Errors have never been discussed on the organizational level.
We do, however, have a quality system, which implies a focus on
error prevention, procedures for dealing with specific errors, and
registration of customer complaints aimed at improvement” and
“Yes, we do have a very precise procedure for the registration of
errors, deviations, and accidents.” Although the latter seems to
indicate a systematic approach to errors, it was only related to the
registration and not to the handling of errors.
The absence of organizational visions regarding errors suggests
that managers took their approach to handling errors for granted
and did not think deeply about the topic. This provides suggestive
evidence for the notion that how errors are dealt with is to some
extent anchored in organizations’ implicit norms and assumptions
and, as such, more hidden. However, interviewees did not have
any difficulties coming up with examples of recent error situations
or articulating how management dealt with such situations. Exam-
ples of errors mentioned by the interviewees are calculation errors
in offers to clients, errors in employment contracts, bad planning
and not meeting the deadline for a product presentation, purchas-
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among All Variables in Study 1
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Age 49.39 41.34 —
2. Size 227.69 101.95 .10 —
3. Business services — — .31* .05 —
4. Production — — .15 .08 .37** —
5. Trade — — .11 .07 .38** .43** —
6. Error management culture 3.22 0.27 .02 .23† .04 .16 .07 —
7. Error aversion culture 2.61 0.30 .04 .21† .02 .23† .16 .20† —
8. Firm goal achievement 3.53 0.44 .04 .09 .11 .05 .26* .34** .14 —
9. Firm survivability 4.08 1.00 .13 .16 .22 .11 .25 .46* .00 .24 —
Note. n was either 25 (correlations involving firm survivability) or 65 (all other correlations). Dashes indicate data are not informative and were therefore
not reported.
† p  .10. * p  .05. ** p  .01.
Table 2
Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Firm Goal Achievement and Firm Survivability on Error Management Culture and Error
Aversion Culture in Study 1
Independent variable
Firm goal achievement Firm survivability
 df R2 F R2 F  df R2 F R2 F
Step 1 5, 59 .08 1.08 4, 20 .11 0.60
Age .07 .15
Size .08 .05
Business services .05 —
Production .13 .31
Trade .33† .45
Step 2 2, 57 .16 6.23* .25 2.69* 2, 18 .21 3.35† .35 1.61
Error management culture .42** .51*
Error aversion culture .16 .31
Note. n  65 for firm goal achievement and 25 for firm survivability. Dash indicates data are not informative and were therefore not reported.
† p  .10. * p  .05. ** p  .01.
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ing errors, not being alert when getting false or insufficient infor-
mation from clients, faulty delivery of products, printing of 3
million letters on which the address headings did not match the
size of the envelope windows, and the duplicate hiring of 17
temporary employees from two different agencies. As these ex-
amples show, what managers discussed in the interviews were
errors with social, quality, and financial consequences; there were
no errors that were directly related to the area of safety.
Table 3 presents some illustrative quotes of the four dimensions
of error culture that were extracted from the interview data. For
example, error management culture implies an open, free, and
constructive communication about errors. Moreover, it entails er-
ror analysis, with a focus on quick error recovery and learning. The
quotes on error aversion culture suggest that fear of being caught
while making a mistake is an important issue. People put a lot of
energy into hiding the fact that they have made errors. This factor
certainly needs to be developed in more detail in future studies.
Although the number of interviewees does not warrant a quan-
titative analysis of our qualitative data, as the lack of power may
render any result nonsignificant, the correlation between error
management culture, as rated in the qualitative study, and the error
management culture scale was .40 (n  16, p  .07, one-tailed).
In addition, there were substantial relations between the interview
measures of error management culture, empathy, and blame and
punishment. For example, managers who worked in a high-error
management culture tended to be less castigatory when errors
occurred and showed more empathy (r  –.64, n  13, p  .05
and r  .59, n  14, p  .05, respectively). These correlations
suggest that high empathy and low blame and punishment may be
normative prerequisites for the development of a high-error man-
agement culture.
Another finding from our interview study was that managers
from organizations who scored high on error management and
empathy and low on blame and punishment tended to offer an
explicit rationale for their approach to errors (e.g., “We believe,
e.g., the only way to control damage” and “[otherwise] people will
get frustrated, fearful, they will be less open [. . . ] and therefore
errors will be discovered later on”). Conversely, those from cul-
tures characterized by low-error management and empathy and
high blame and punishment tended to merely restate their approach
(e.g., “[. . . ] this should not happen again. And that was the end of
it.”). Thus, an error management culture may be the result of a
conscious decision by the company and its managers. This inter-
pretation underlines our argument that a firm needs some sort of
Table 3
Illustrative Interview Quotes for Error Culture Dimensions in Study 1
Dimension Low High
Error management culture “But I don’t want to discuss errors at great length.
I indicated that this shouldn’t happen again.
And that was the end of it.” (Retail, Score:
2.85)
“I try to create an open atmosphere and tell people they should inform
me if they have made a mistake, so that we can do something about
it. We try to be open and discuss errors because we believe that is
the only way to control damage.” (Administration, Score: 4.75)
“In this organization, we don’t talk about errors.”
(Consultancy, Score: 2.73)
“I have spoken to the responsible manager and have asked him to use
this incident as a learning opportunity in his department.”
(Wholesale, Score: 4.50)
“What we do is talk about it with people and analyze what has to be
done in order to prevent these errors in the future.” (Wholesale,
Score: 4.35)
“First, we try to discover where the error originated, what caused it,
and how we can correct it as quickly as possible.” (Automation,
Score: 3.90)
Empathy “I said to her, ‘Tell him.’ ‘But,’ she responded, ‘I
have already informed him [that a certain
person would get a raise].’ ‘Well, that’s your
problem,’ I replied.” (Retail, Score: 2.00)
“If I would have said to that guy, ‘You idiot, how could you have
done that?’ he would have felt really small, while ‘why don’t you
come up with something that will prevent this error in the future’
will make him feel like a hero.” (Administration, Score: 4.50)
Blame and punishment “When I first started as a supervisor, I used to get
angry at people when they made a mistake.
That is very easy and seems forceful. But you
have to get used to the fact that it simply does
not work. People will get frustrated, fearful,
they will be less open about their mistakes, and,
therefore, errors will be discovered later.”
(Administration, Score: 1.25)
“Errors. . . . Well, I accept errors in the sense that when a person
makes too many, they’re fired.” (Construction, Score: 3.80)
“Don’t keep matters bottled up. People shouldn’t
be given hell about their errors. People have to
learn from their errors. I make errors myself.”
(Wholesale, Score: 1.75)
“It will be fatal for him [the employee who made a mistake] if the
customer finds out.”
Error aversion culture “We specifically don’t want to disguise our own
mistakes. We want them out in the open.”
(Wholesale, Score: 1.00)
“The funny thing was that I got an evasive reaction at first, like ‘don’t
worry, nothing’s wrong.’ And then when I started digging a bit
deeper, I found a chain of things that indicated people were
protecting each other.” (Consultancy, Score: 4.30)
“The workers have to put a stamp with their identification code on
their work [. . .]. But they’re even smarter, they just don’t put down
their identification code so that we don’t know who made the
mistake.” (Retail, Score: 3.15)
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explicit concept of how to deal with errors to be high on error
management culture; in firms that do not have such an explicit
strategy, the fundamental attribution error will tend to produce
some kind of blaming culture.
In conclusion, the results of our qualitative study suggest that
managers were indeed able to talk about errors but that they
generally did not hold explicit concepts for how to deal with errors.
Moreover, there were few explicit organizational mission state-
ments or visions with regard to errors. Managers typically thought
of errors that were related to quality and financial effects but not
to safety issues. Moreover, the two dimensions used in the sur-
vey—error management culture and error aversion culture—could
also be found in the interview study. However, it also became
obvious that not all interview segments relating to error culture
could be categorized into those two categories. Two additional
concepts appeared—empathy and blame and punishment—and
although we did not include items on these dimensions in our
survey, the qualitative material suggests that both were related to
error management culture.
Study 1: Discussion
To establish the concept of error culture, its subdimensions, and
its relation to firm performance, we collected both qualitative and
quantitative data from a random sample of organizations in the
Netherlands. The results of our interview study reinforced our
belief that it was possible to meaningfully study error management
culture in organizations. Moreover, they provided us with valuable
insights into the nature of errors typically occurring in organiza-
tions. Finally, they highlighted the importance for managers to
develop a systematic error management approach to rationally deal
with errors and to learn from them. Important mechanisms sug-
gested by the qualitative study for the successful cultivation of a
systematic error management approach may be low blame and
punishment and a relatively high degree of empathy with the erring
individual.
The results of our survey study provided initial support for the
hypothesis that error management culture positively relates to firm
performance—our measure of error management culture signifi-
cantly correlated with two indicators of firm performance, firm
goal achievement and firm survivability. This effect was upheld
when we controlled for age, organizational size, and line of indus-
try. However, there was no evidence that error aversion culture
was related to firm performance.
Contrary to our expectation, the relation between firm goal
achievement and firm survivability failed to reach statistical sig-
nificance. Although lack of statistical power (the power to detect
a correlation of .30 in a sample with 25 participating firms was
below .40) may partially account for this nonfinding; the two
measures may also relate to different aspects of firm performance.
Firm goal achievement refers to organizational goals and goal
attainment relative to direct competitors and is more subjective.
Our objective measure of firm survivability comprises several
economic indicators weighted according to their prediction of
organizational survival in that line of industry. Previous research
suggests that different measures of firm performance may not
always converge. For example, Meyer and Gupta (1994) argued
that organizational effectiveness is a multidimensional concept,
with indicators of these various dimensions frequently demonstrat-
ing zero or negative correlations among each other.
Although a definite strength of our quantitative study is that we
collected data from different sources to measure error culture and
firm performance (i.e., our objective indicator of firm survivability
was developed by a commercial firm for purposes unrelated to our
research efforts), there are a number of limitations to this study.
First, we used a cross-sectional design, prohibiting us from con-
clusively refuting the claim that it is not error management culture
that leads to better firm performance but rather that it is high firm
performance that enables or encourages the development of a
systematic error management approach. Second, although one
would not expect a high correlation between various indicators of
firm performance, no relation emerged between firm goal achieve-
ment and firm survivability. Third, the number of participating
companies was low; the most important finding—the relation
between firm survivability and error management culture—was
only based on 25 companies.
To address these concerns and to reduce the uncertainties asso-
ciated with drawing conclusions from any single study, we con-
ducted a second study designed to provide a constructive replica-
tion of Study 1. In contrast to the first study, Study 2 allowed for
the assessment of change in firm economic performance, thereby
directly addressing one of the primary ambiguities of Study 1.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was carried out in Germany. This provided us with the
opportunity to test whether the significant relation between error
management culture and performance found in Study 1 would also
emerge in a different cultural context. Germany and the Nether-
lands belong to different clusters of leadership culture (Brodbeck
et al., 2000). The Netherlands scores lower than Germany on error
intolerance (among 62 countries, the Netherlands ranked 12th in
terms of error intolerance, whereas West Germany ranked 2nd3)
and lower on uncertainty avoidance (indicating that the uncertain-
ties brought about by errors are expected to have less negative
consequences) (House et al., 2004). Because we focused on the
replication of the significant effects of error management culture
on performance, only error management culture was included in
our questionnaire.
Method
Sample and Procedures
Drawing on the 1998 Hoppenstedt, a large database of German firms that
provides company profiles and financial information, we selected firms on
the basis of four criteria. First, because a company’s culture tends to
become more fragmented as the number of employees increases, we
focused on medium-sized firms as we did in Study 1. Second, to ensure that
companies included in our sample would be representative of the German
economy at large, we mainly selected firms from the industrial and service
sectors (Simon, 1996). Third, we only included companies for which
current financial performance data were available. Finally, because merg-
ing can have a negative effect on a firm’s economic performance, we
excluded companies that had recently merged.
3 Thanks are due to Paul Hanges for calculating this particular item
across all 62 participating GLOBE countries.
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Using these criteria, we identified 269 companies. To ensure consistency
across firms, we contacted the managers of the personnel or marketing
departments of the companies and asked them to distribute the surveys to
their colleagues, providing as much a representative cross-section of the
company’s management as possible. We considered a company response
usable if at least three managers returned their surveys. Usable responses
were obtained from 47 companies, for a participation rate of 17% (165
respondents). There were no statistically significant differences between
participating and nonparticipating companies in terms of sector distribu-
tion, 2(4)  1.90, p  .05, average number of employees, t(57)  1.14,
p  .05, and return on assets in 1998, t(258)  –0.74, p  .05.
Companies were located throughout Germany. More than half of them
were manufacturing firms from the food, clothing, metal goods, mechan-
ical/computer engineering, and electrical engineering sectors, among oth-
ers. Our sample also included companies from the transportation, utilities,
wholesale trade, financial services, and miscellaneous services sectors.
Almost all of the companies were profitable and reported a positive return
on assets for the period between January and December 1998, with a mean
of 8.61%. The average firm size was 410 employees. Of the 47 companies,
49% were limited liability companies, and 51% were publicly traded.
Measures
Error management culture. We used the same 17-item measure as in
Study 1. Items were rated on a scale that ranged from 1 (does not apply at
all) to 5 (applies completely) and averaged to form a single indicator ( 
.93).
Firm performance. Two measures assessed firm performance: Firm
Goal Achievement and Return on Assets. Firm goal achievement was
based on the two items developed for Study 1; items were averaged to form
a single indicator (  .83). Return on assets, a common accounting-based
measure of firm profitability, was calculated by dividing annual profit plus
interest expense by averaged invested capital. We focused on return on
assets as our indicator of firm profitability for several reasons. First, return
on assets is a relevant measure of operating efficiency, as it reflects a
company’s long-term financial strength. Second, return on assets has
frequently been used by researchers to measure company profitability (e.g.,
Staw & Epstein, 2000; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Third, it is the profit-
ability ratio most consistently reported by the Hoppenstedt database.
Surveys were sent out in the fall of 1998 and archival data on company
profitability for the period between January and December 1998 were
obtained in the summer and fall of 1999 from the 1999 Hoppenstedt
database. Archival profitability data for the period between January and
December 1997 were taken from the same database. The Hoppenstedt
database did not report return on assets for companies that made losses but
rather approximated their profitability with zero. This was the case for six
companies in 1998 and for four companies in 1997, and to avoid a
reduction in sample size, we used this approximation for those companies.
Control variables. We controlled for company size (natural logarithm
of average number of employees) and industry sector (0  manufacturing,
1 nonmanufacturing) in all substantive analyses. In addition, to calculate
the effects of error management culture on changes in company profitabil-
ity, we controlled for prior firm performance (return on assets 1997).
We calculated estimates of within-group interrater reliability using the
formula suggested by James et al. (1984). The average value for rWG(J)
across all 47 companies was .91 for error management culture and .80 for
firm goal achievement, exceeding the .70 criterion suggested by Klein et al.
(2000). These values indicate an acceptable level of agreement within
organizations, thus justifying aggregation and averaging of data to the
organizational level.
Results
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of the study variables
are presented in Table 4. There was a significant positive correla-
tion between firm goal achievement and return on assets 1998 (r
.41, p  .01), indicating moderate convergence between the two
measures of firm performance. Return on assets 1998 was signif-
icantly related to prior profitability (r  .52, p  .01).
To test our hypothesis, we conducted hierarchical regression
analyses (see Table 5). Entering the control variables of size,
industry sector, and return on assets 1997 into the regression model
yielded significant equations for return on assets 1998 as well as
firm goal achievement (R2  .33, p  .01 and R2  .17, p 
.05, respectively), with prior firm profitability positively relating to
both performance indicators (  .46, p  .01 and   .40, p 
.01, respectively). In Step 2 of the model, we entered error man-
agement culture. As expected, error management culture was pos-
itively and significantly related to both change of return on assets
1998 and firm goal achievement (  .27, p  .05 and   .58,
p  .01, respectively). These results provide support for our
hypothesis by demonstrating that error management culture pre-
dicts profitability over and above the effects accounted for by prior
firm performance. Thus, our hypothesis was confirmed and the
results obtained in Study 1 replicated using change in firm
profitability.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous research has emphasized the difficulties of establishing
significant relations with firm performance (March & Sutton,
1997). This makes our cross-replicated findings of the relation
between error management culture and firm performance in
medium-sized companies that much more important. In line with
our hypothesis, the results of both studies seem to suggest that
error management culture contributes positively to firm perfor-
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among All Variables in Study 2
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Size 5.79 0.70 —
2. Industry sector — — .29† —
3. Error management culture 3.43 0.41 .17 .05 —
4. Firm goal achievement 3.39 0.64 .15 .05 .65** —
5. Return on assets 1997 9.61 9.30 .19 .27† .26† .34* —
6. Return on assets 1998 8.61 8.28 .31* .29† .32* .41** .52** —
Note. n  47. Dashes indicate data are not informative and were therefore not reported.
† p  .10. * p  .05. ** p  .01.
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mance and survivability. This makes sense because error manage-
ment is at the core of what error culture is all about. Communi-
cating about errors, sharing error knowledge, helping in error
situations as well as quick error detection and analysis, effective
error recovery, and coordinated error handling efforts—the facets
of error management culture—are all directly aimed at avoiding
and reducing negative error consequences and developing better
strategies for handling errors in the future. Our results are consis-
tent with Edmondson (1996), Rochlin (1999), and Helmreich and
Merritt (2000), who emphasized the importance of free-flowing
communication, rewarding the reporting of errors (or at least not
punishing them), and a continuous reflexive and interactive learn-
ing approach in enhancing the success and safety in high-reliability
organizations.
In contrast to our expectations, however, we found no support
for a relation between error aversion culture and firm performance
in Study 1. Two reasons may account for this nonfinding. First,
error aversion may be the result of two separate processes that do
not always coincide; people may feel strain when an error occurs
because of high commitment to good performance or because their
supervisors react negatively to errors. Second, the error aversion
measure used may be conceptually ambiguous, as it captures not
only the extent to which individuals experience strain resulting
from errors but also the extent to which they cover up their errors.
Strain and covering up may not be part of the same construct.
Further research is needed in this area.
Strengths and Limitations
One strength of our study is that we obtained objective indica-
tors of firm performance in both samples. Although these perfor-
mance measures were conceptually different—the one used in the
Netherlands was a measure of firm survivability derived from a
complex regression analysis, and the one used in Germany was a
relatively straightforward and frequently used index of profitabil-
ity—they both were significantly related to error management
culture. In addition, although there was no significant correlation
between firm goal achievement and firm economic performance in
Study 1, we did find a significant association between firm goal
achievement and return on assets in Study 2. The correlations from
Studies 1 and 2 did not significantly differ from each other (z 
–.87, p  .05), suggesting that lack of power may have been the
reason that the correlation between firm goal achievement and
economic performance did not reach statistical significance in
Study 1. An additional strength of our study is that we controlled
for prior return on assets in Study 2, allowing us to demonstrate
that firms’ error management culture affected changes in firm
profitability.
Despite these strengths, there are limitations that need to be
considered. First, although our study is unique in that we estab-
lished and replicated a significant relation between organizational
error management and firm performance across two different cul-
tural and economic contexts, our quantitative findings do not
reveal the precise mechanisms by which error management culture
translates into better performance. Future research should address
this issue by examining the factors suggested in Figure 1—vari-
ables such as learning, secondary error prevention, and exploration
may shed light on the potential mechanisms mediating the effects
of error management culture on firm performance.
A second limitation of our study is that we exclusively focused
on managers as potential informants for our study. Although it
makes sense to do so (see our earlier arguments), a legitimate
concern is whether perceptions of organizational error culture are
similar across managers and rank-and-file workers. To partially
address this concern, we attempted in both studies to include a
wide range of managers from different departments occupying
different hierarchical positions. Despite this diversity in positions
and departmental affiliations, managers tended to agree in their
assessment of their company’s error culture, indicating that error
culture may indeed be a pervasive organizational characteristic.
Nevertheless, it is still possible that managers and rank-and-file
workers differ in their assessment of their company’s culture.
Future research should address this concern by collecting infor-
mation from both managers and workers.
Although all companies may benefit from an error management
approach, we believe that they do so in different ways and to a
different extent, depending on certain organizational and contex-
tual conditions. Specifically, in line with the contingency argument
advanced by Sitkin et al. (1994), we argue that for some organi-
zations, the advantages resulting from implementing a systematic
error management approach may be associated with the issue of
control (e.g., quick error detection, quick damage control, and the
like), whereas for others, they may be associated with the issue of
learning (i.e., exploration, experimentations, and so forth). The
issue may depend on the line of industry, on the rate of organiza-
tional change, or on economic conditions present in the industry.
Moreover, we think that environmental and production uncertainty
Table 5
Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Firm Goal Achievement and Return on Assets 1998 on Error Management Culture in Study 2
Independent variable
Firm goal achievement Return on assets 1998
 df R2 F R2 F  df R2 F R2 F
Step 1 3, 43 .17 2.93* 3, 43 .33 6.93**
Size .20 .19
Industry sector .10 .11
Return on assets 1997 .40** .46**
Step 2 1, 42 .30 23.29** .47 9.16** 1, 42 .06 4.51* .39 6.75**
Error management culture .58** .27*
Note. n  47.
† p  .10. * p  .05. ** p  .01.
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may affect the extent to which error management enhances firm
performance (Wall & Jackson, 1995). Specifically, companies
with complex products or services that operate in a turbulent
environment should benefit relatively more from an error manage-
ment approach than companies in which production and services
are highly standardized and the environment is relatively
predictable.
Error management may also be more or less effective, depend-
ing on the type of error occurring. An empirically tested error
taxonomy suggested by Zapf et al. (1992) could be used to exam-
ine the usefulness of error management vis-a`-vis different errors.
For example, Zapf et al. showed that error handling time was
higher for knowledge errors (i.e., errors resulting from lack of
knowledge) and judgment errors (i.e., not understanding feedback
correctly) than for habit errors (i.e., errors resulting from overrou-
tinized use of a habit). Longer error handling times may imply that
certain errors are more difficult to detect than others (Zapf et al.,
1992). Error management approaches may still be effective but
require higher skills when dealing with such errors.
Practical Implications
One may argue that the relations observed in both studies may
not be strong enough to justify any practical implications (betas
ranging from .27 to .58). For the following argument, we assume
that an intervention program is able to improve an organization’s
error management culture by one standard deviation—a number
that seems reasonable given the effects sizes obtained from man-
agerial training interventions (e.g., Burke & Day, 1986). A utility
calculation based on the unstandardized regression weights from
Study 2 informs us that manufacturing companies could increase
their return on assets from 7.7% to 10% (from 9.9% to 12.2% for
nonmanufacturing companies) if they would intervene to improve
their error management culture by one standard deviation. Thus, a
one standard deviation improvement in error management culture
results in an increase in firm profitability by approximately 19%–
23%. A company that generates a $1,000,000 return on assets
could thereby increase its gains by approximately $200,000. We
believe that organizations should be interested in such increases
and that programs that cultivate a systematic error management
approach would most likely prove to be cost-effective.
Previous research suggests that individuals can learn from errors
(Keith & Frese, 2005) and that quick error detection and recovery,
as well as open communication about errors—hallmarks of an
error management approach—can have positive implications for
organizations (Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Helmreich & Merritt,
2000; Reason, 1997). Our results extend this earlier research by
demonstrating that the extent to which medium-sized firms culti-
vate an error management approach positively relates to their
financial performance. Although more scientific information is
needed on how error management culture functions and how it
affects firm performance, and because changing culture is inher-
ently difficult (Trice & Beyer, 1993), our research allows us to
offer some more general recommendations. Organizations may
want to act on errors more quickly and analyze them more effec-
tively to better control their negative consequences. Moreover, our
research highlights the importance of organizations opening up
communication channels to allow for the discussion of errors,
documenting errors, and using errors strategically as potential
learning opportunities. Small errors that have relatively minor or
no negative consequences are of particular importance here (e.g.,
near misses) (Helmreich, 2000; Sitkin, 1996). The aviation indus-
try has made significant advances in this regard, and with respect
to implementing error management principles in general, training
has been used to increase within-crew communication about errors
(Helmreich, 2000), documentation of errors has been systemati-
cally organized, and the Federal Aviation Administration has stip-
ulated that near misses have to be reported anonymously and that
disciplinary actions against those reporting such incidents are
waived (Reason, 1997).
Although we focused in this article on error management, we do
not wish to suggest that error prevention is unimportant. Rather,
we argue that error prevention is required as a first line of defense
to ensure smooth flow and high quality of production and services
as well as to enhance safety in organizations. However, although
most firms use error prevention strategies, few attempt to explicitly
use error management principles as a second line of defense
against negative error consequences. Our qualitative data suggest
that error prevention was generally done in a nonconscious way
and that error management culture required a more explicit effort.
Thus, organizations may need to implement explicit, systematic
error management strategies to successfully deal with errors.
Managers sometimes argue against our error management
ideas because companies cannot afford to produce faulty prod-
ucts. The latter is obviously correct. However, a faulty product
is an error consequence. In fact, faulty products may be the
result of a breakdown of error prevention and lack of error
management. Managers may also ask how they can reward
performance, punish nonperformance, and still be tolerant of
errors. Are frequent errors not symptoms of a low degree of
performance? The answer to this question is difficult because
errors and lack of performance are probably related. Managers
have to walk a fine line between taking errors seriously and
emphasizing error tolerance and between using information on
errors as examples of (lack of) performance and using errors as
opportunities for learning. This duality of control and learning
has been applied and recognized in areas such as total quality
management (total quality control and total quality learning;
Sitkin et al., 1994), exploitation versus exploration (March,
1991), and organizational learning (Argyris, 1992; Huber,
1991). An organization attempting to implement an error man-
agement culture may learn from this literature.
There are some, albeit not many, companies that incorporate a
constructive orientation toward errors as part of their policy state-
ment (e.g., BMW suggested in their mission statement that em-
ployees should not look for the guilty party in an error situation but
solve the problem; 3M is known for its constructive and innovative
orientation, which includes learning from errors; Southwest Air-
lines proposed that “failure is a natural result of the competitive
process;” Trice & Beyer, 1993, p. 3). Some companies even use
errors explicitly as a learning opportunity (e.g., in one small
German consulting company, people take turns talking about one
error they have encountered at each of their meetings). Yet, despite
these encouraging examples, we believe that, to date, the potential
for error management culture to provide organizations with a
competitive edge has not been fully realized.
1238 VAN DYCK, FRESE, BAER, AND SONNENTAG
References
Argyris, C. (1992). On organizational learning. Oxford, England: Black-
well Publishers.
Audia, P. G., Locke, E. A., & Smith, K. G. (2000). The paradox of success:
An archival and laboratory study of strategic persistence following
radical environmental change. Academy of Management Journal, 43,
837–853.
Baer, M., & Frese, M. (2003). Innovation is not enough: Climates for
initiative and psychological safety, process innovations, and firm per-
formance. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, 45–68.
Bragger, J. D., Hantula, D. A., Bragger, D., & Kirnan, J. (2003). When
success breeds failure: History, hysteresis, and delayed exit decisions.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 6–14.
Brodbeck, F. C., Frese, M., Akerblom, S., Audia, G., Bakacsi, G., Ben-
dova, H., et al. (2000). Cultural variation of leadership prototypes across
22 European countries. Journal of Occupational and Organizational
Psychology, 73, 1–29.
Brown, R. S., Williams, C. W., & Leeshaley, P. R. (1994). The effects of
hindsight bias and causal attribution on human response to environmen-
tal events. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 661–674.
Burke, M. J., & Day, R. R. (1986). A cumulative study of the effec-
tiveness of managerial training. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71,
232–245.
Cannon, M. D., & Edmondson, A. C. (2001). Confronting failure: Ante-
cedents and consequences of shared beliefs about failure in organiza-
tional work groups. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 161–177.
De Breed & Partners. (1996). Fire on firms: Firms on fire. Breda, the
Netherlands: Author.
Dormann, T., & Frese, M. (1994). Error training: Replication and the
function of exploratory behavior. International Journal of Human-
Computer Interaction, 6, 365–372.
Edmondson, A. C. (1996). Learning from mistakes is easier said than done:
Group and organizational influences on the detection and correction of
human error. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 5–28.
Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work
teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 350–383.
Flanagan, J. C. (1954). The critical incident technique. Psychological
Bulletin, 51, 327–358.
Frese, M. (1991). Error management or error prevention: Two strategies to
deal with errors in software design. In H.-J. Bullinger (Ed.), Human
aspects in computing: Design and use of interactive systems and work
with terminals (pp. 776–782). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Frese, M. (1995). Error management in training: Conceptual and empirical
results. In C. Zucchermaglio, S. Bagnara, & S. Stucky (Eds.), Organi-
zational learning and technological change (pp. 112–124). Berlin, Ger-
many: Springer-Verlag.
Frese, M., & Fay, D. (2001). Personal initiative (PI): A concept for work
in the 21st century. Research in Organizational Behavior, 23, 133–188.
Garud, R., Nayyar, P. R., & Shapira, Z. (1999). In R. Garud, P. Nayyar, &
Z. Shapira (Eds.), Technological innovation: Oversights and foresights
(pp. 19–40). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 117, 21–38.
Heimbeck, D., Frese, M., Sonnentag, S., & Keith, N. (2003). Integrating
errors into the training process: The function of error management
instructions and the role of goal orientation. Personnel Psychology, 56,
333–362.
Helmreich, R. L. (2000). On error management: Lessons from aviation.
British Medical Journal, 320, 781–785.
Helmreich, R. L., & Merritt, A. C. (2000). Safety and error management:
The role of crew resource management. In B. J. Hayward & A. R. Lowe
(Eds.), Aviation resource management (pp. 107–119). Aldershot, En-
gland: Ashgate Publishing.
Hockey, R. (1996). Skilled performance and mental workload. In P. Warr
(Ed.), Psychology at work (4th ed., pp. 13–39). London: Penguin.
Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Tuttle, D. B., & Sego, D. J. (1995). Team
performance on monitoring tasks: An examination of decision errors in
contexts requiring sustained attention. Journal of Applied Psychology,
80, 685–696.
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V.
(Eds.). (2004). Cultures, leadership and organizations: A 62 nation
GLOBE study. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes
and the literature. Organization Science, 2, 88–115.
Ivancic, K., & Hesketh, B. (2000). Learning from errors in a driving
simulation: Effects on driving skill and self-confidence. Ergonomics, 43,
1966–1984.
James, L. R., Demaree, R. G., & Wolf, G. (1984). Estimating within-group
interrater reliability with and without response bias. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 69, 85–98.
Jones, C. F., & O’Brien, J. (1991). Mistakes that worked. New York:
Bantam Books/Doubleday.
Keith, N., & Frese, M. (2005). Self-regulation in error management train-
ing: Emotion control and metacognition as mediators of performance
effects. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 677–691.
Kenny, D. A., & La Voie, L. (1985). Separating individual and
group effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48,
339 –348.
Klein, K. J., Bliese, P. D., Kozlowski, S. W. J., Dansereau, F., Gavin,
M. B., Griffin, M. A., et al. (2000). Multilevel analytical tech-
niques: Commonalities, differences, and continuing questions.
In K. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), Multilevel theory, research,
and methods in organizations (pp. 512–553). San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
Klein, K. J., Dansereau, F., & Hall, R. J. (1994). Levels issues in theory
development, data collection, and analysis. Academy of Management
Review, 19, 195–229.
Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Klein, K. J. (2000). A multilevel approach to theory
and research in organizations: Contextual, temporal, and emergent pro-
cesses. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), Multilevel theory,
research, and methods in organizations (pp. 3–90). San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learn-
ing. Organization Science, 2, 71–87.
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. Oxford, England:
Wiley.
March, J. G., & Sutton, R. I. (1997). Organizational performance as a
dependent variable. Organization Science, 8, 698–706.
Mathieu, J. E., Goodwin, G. F., Heffner, T. S., Salas, E., & Cannon-
Bowers, J. A. (2000). The influence of shared mental models on team
process and performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 273–
283.
McCune, J. C. (1997). Making lemonade. Management Review, 86,
49 –53.
Meijman, T. F., & Mulder, G. (1998). Psychological aspects of workload.
In P. Drenth, H. Thierry, & C. De Wolff (Eds.), Handbook of work and
organizational psychology (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 5–33). London: Psy-
chology Press.
Merriam-Webster. (1967). Webster’s seventh new collegiate dictionary.
Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company.
Meyer, M. G., & Gupta, V. (1994). The performance paradox. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 16, 309–369.
Murphy, L. R. (1996). Stress management in work settings: A critical
review of health effects. American Journal of Health Promotion, 11,
112–135.
Nordstrom, C. R., Wendland, D., & Williams, K. B. (1998). “To err is
1239ORGANIZATIONAL ERROR MANAGEMENT CULTURE
human”: An examination of the effectiveness of error management
training. Journal of Business and Psychology, 12, 269–282.
Peters, T. (1987). Thriving on chaos. New York: Harper & Row.
Reason, J. (1990). Human error. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Hamp-
shire, England: Ashgate Publishing.
Reichers, A. E., & Schneider, B. (1990). Climate and culture: An evolution
of constructs. In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture
(pp. 5–39). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rochlin, G. I. (1999). Safe operation as a social construct. Ergonomics, 42,
1549–1560.
Rybowiak, V., Garst, H., Frese, M., & Batinic, B. (1999). Error orientation
questionnaire (EOQ): Reliability, validity, and different language equiv-
alence. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20, 527–547.
Schein, E. H. (1992). Organizational culture and leadership (2nd ed.). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Senders, J. W., & Moray, N. P. (1991). Human error: Case, prediction,
and reduction. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Simon, H. (1996). The hidden champions: Lessons from 500 of the world’s
best unknown companies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School
Press.
Sitkin, S. B. (1996). Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses.
In M. Cohen & U. Sproull (Eds.), Organizational learning (pp. 541–
577). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sitkin, S. B., Sutcliffe, K. M., Roger, G., & Schroeder, R. G. (1994).
Distinguishing control from learning in total quality management: A
contingency perspective. Academy of Management Review, 19, 537–
564.
Staw, B. M., & Epstein, L. D. (2000). What bandwagons bring: Effects of
popular management techniques on corporate performance, reputation,
and CEO pay. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 523–556.
Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. (1993). The cultures of work organizations.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Wall, T. D., & Jackson, P. S. (1995). New manufacturing initiatives and
shopfloor job design. In A. Howard (Ed.), The changing nature of work
(pp. 139–174). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Wan, W. P., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2003). Home country environments,
corporate diversification strategies, and firm performance. Academy of
Management Journal, 46, 27–45.
Zapf, D., Brodbeck, F. C., Frese, M., Peters, H., & Pru¨mper, J. (1992).
Errors in working with computers: A first validation of a taxonomy for
observed errors in a field setting. International Journal of Human-
Computer Interaction, 4, 311–339.
Received February 20, 2004
Revision received November 21, 2004
Accepted November 29, 2004 
Appendix
Scales and Items
Error Management Culture
1. For us, errors are very useful for improving the work process.
2. After an error, people think through how to correct it.
3. After an error has occurred, it is analyzed thoroughly.
4. If something went wrong, people take the time to think it through.
5. After making a mistake, people try to analyze what caused it.
6. In this organization, people think a lot about how an error could have been avoided.
7. An error provides important information for the continuation of the work.
8. Our errors point us at what we can improve.
9. When mastering a task, people can learn a lot from their mistakes.
10. When an error has occurred, we usually know how to rectify it.
11. When an error is made, it is corrected right away.
12. Although we make mistakes, we don’t let go of the final goal.
13. When people are unable to correct an error by themselves, they turn to their colleagues.
14. If people are unable to continue their work after an error, they can rely on others.
15. When people make an error, they can ask others for advice on how to continue.
16. When someone makes an error, (s)he shares it with others so that they don’t make the same mistake.
17. In this organization, people think a lot about how an error could have been avoided.
Error Aversion Culture
1. In this organization, people feel stressed when making mistakes.
2. In general, people in this organization feel embarrassed after making a mistake.
3. People in this organization are often afraid of making errors.
4. In this organization, people get upset and irritated if an error occurs.
5. During their work, people are often concerned that errors might occur.
6. Our motto is, “Why admit an error when no one will find out?”
7. There is no point in discussing errors with others.
8. There are advantages in covering up one’s errors.
9. People prefer to keep errors to themselves.
10. Employees who admit their errors are asking for trouble.
11. It can be harmful to make your errors known to others.
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